mbedtls: Update to upstream version 2.16.5
Fixes https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-02 Drop patch to disable VIA padlock since we no longer use libwebsockets, so there's no conflict anymore.
This commit is contained in:
Rémi Verschelde
122
thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkparse.c
vendored
122
thirdparty/mbedtls/library/pkparse.c
vendored
@ -677,6 +677,32 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Wrapper around mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi() that rejects zero.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The value zero is:
|
||||
* - never a valid value for an RSA parameter
|
||||
* - interpreted as "omitted, please reconstruct" by mbedtls_rsa_complete().
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Since values can't be omitted in PKCS#1, passing a zero value to
|
||||
* rsa_complete() would be incorrect, so reject zero values early.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static int asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( unsigned char **p,
|
||||
const unsigned char *end,
|
||||
mbedtls_mpi *X )
|
||||
{
|
||||
int ret;
|
||||
|
||||
ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( p, end, X );
|
||||
if( ret != 0 )
|
||||
return( ret );
|
||||
|
||||
if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( X, 0 ) == 0 )
|
||||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT );
|
||||
|
||||
return( 0 );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Parse a PKCS#1 encoded private RSA key
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@ -729,54 +755,84 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der( mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Import N */
|
||||
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
|
||||
MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ||
|
||||
( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( rsa, p, len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
|
||||
NULL, 0, NULL, 0 ) ) != 0 )
|
||||
if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
|
||||
( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, &T, NULL, NULL,
|
||||
NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 )
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
p += len;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Import E */
|
||||
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
|
||||
MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ||
|
||||
( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( rsa, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
|
||||
NULL, 0, p, len ) ) != 0 )
|
||||
if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
|
||||
( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL,
|
||||
NULL, &T ) ) != 0 )
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
p += len;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Import D */
|
||||
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
|
||||
MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ||
|
||||
( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( rsa, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
|
||||
p, len, NULL, 0 ) ) != 0 )
|
||||
if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
|
||||
( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL,
|
||||
&T, NULL ) ) != 0 )
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
p += len;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Import P */
|
||||
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
|
||||
MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ||
|
||||
( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( rsa, NULL, 0, p, len, NULL, 0,
|
||||
NULL, 0, NULL, 0 ) ) != 0 )
|
||||
if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
|
||||
( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, NULL, &T, NULL,
|
||||
NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 )
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
p += len;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Import Q */
|
||||
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
|
||||
MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER ) ) != 0 ||
|
||||
( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( rsa, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, p, len,
|
||||
NULL, 0, NULL, 0 ) ) != 0 )
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
p += len;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Complete the RSA private key */
|
||||
if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_complete( rsa ) ) != 0 )
|
||||
if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
|
||||
( ret = mbedtls_rsa_import( rsa, NULL, NULL, &T,
|
||||
NULL, NULL ) ) != 0 )
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Check optional parameters */
|
||||
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
|
||||
( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
|
||||
( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 )
|
||||
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT)
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* The RSA CRT parameters DP, DQ and QP are nominally redundant, in
|
||||
* that they can be easily recomputed from D, P and Q. However by
|
||||
* parsing them from the PKCS1 structure it is possible to avoid
|
||||
* recalculating them which both reduces the overhead of loading
|
||||
* RSA private keys into memory and also avoids side channels which
|
||||
* can arise when computing those values, since all of D, P, and Q
|
||||
* are secret. See https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055 for a
|
||||
* description of one such attack.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
/* Import DP */
|
||||
if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
|
||||
( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &rsa->DP, &T ) ) != 0 )
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Import DQ */
|
||||
if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
|
||||
( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &rsa->DQ, &T ) ) != 0 )
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Import QP */
|
||||
if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
|
||||
( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &rsa->QP, &T ) ) != 0 )
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
|
||||
#else
|
||||
/* Verify existance of the CRT params */
|
||||
if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
|
||||
( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
|
||||
( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 )
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
/* rsa_complete() doesn't complete anything with the default
|
||||
* implementation but is still called:
|
||||
* - for the benefit of alternative implementation that may want to
|
||||
* pre-compute stuff beyond what's provided (eg Montgomery factors)
|
||||
* - as is also sanity-checks the key
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Furthermore, we also check the public part for consistency with
|
||||
* mbedtls_pk_parse_pubkey(), as it includes size minima for example.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_complete( rsa ) ) != 0 ||
|
||||
( ret = mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( rsa ) ) != 0 )
|
||||
{
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if( p != end )
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user